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(Ripley, 2012) has argued that a nontransitive substructural logic (NT) provides
both a solution to semantic paradoxes and preserves full classical logic. Here
we argue that NT fulfils these goals only inadequately.
We distinguish between weak and strong inconsistency: A language is weakly
inconsistent for some formula φ iff it proves both ` φ and φ `. It is strongly
inconsistent iff it proves the empty sequent. Although NT is strongly consistent,
it remains weakly inconsistent. For even without Cut, NT derives both ` Tpλq
and Tpλq ` for the Liar sentence λ.
According to Ripley, the characteristic of any paradoxical sentence ψ is that
both ` ψ and ψ ` are provable. However, one can show that NT is weakly
inconsistent for many central theorems of classical logic as well; including the
law of noncontradiction, excluded middle and identity. This is straightfor-
ward in first-order logic when these principles are understood in terms of the
Truth-predicate. With second-order logic, this can be extended to hold of these
theorems understood with arbitrary predicates.
There are two problems. First, NT fails to provide an adequate distinction
between paradoxical and nonparadoxical sentences. For classical theorems bear
the characteristic of paradoxes. Second, it casts doubt on the classicality of NT.
Intuitively, it is not sufficient to merely prove all theorems of classical logic.
For even an inconsistent systemwith explosion will do this. One would further
have to ensure that the systemdoes not prove anything weakly inconsistent
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with these theorems—again, NT fails to do so.
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